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Abstract
Using methods from evolutionary game theory, this paper investigates the difference between
social cohesion and task cohesion in promoting the evolution of cooperation in group interac-
tions. Players engage in public goods games and are allowed to leave their groups if too many
defections occur. Both social cohesion and task cohesion may prevent players from leaving.
While a higher level of social cohesion increases a player’s tolerance towards defections, task
cohesion is associated with her group performance in the past. With a higher level of task cohe-
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sion, it is more likely that a dissatisfied player will refer to the history and remains in her group
if she was satisfied in the past. Our results reveal that social cohesion is detrimental to the evolu-
tion of cooperation while task cohesion facilitates it. This is because social cohesion hinders the
conditional dissociation mechanism but task cohesion improves the robustness of cooperative
groups which are usually vulnerable to mistakes. We also discuss other potential aspects of co-
hesion and how they can be investigated through our modelling. Overall, our analysis provides
novel insights into the relationship between group cohesion and group performance through
studying the group dynamics and suggests further application of evolutionary game theory in
this area.
Keywords: public goods game, cooperation, evolutionary game theory, conditional dissoci-
ation, social cohesion, task cohesion
1 Introduction
Group cohesion or cohesiveness is one of the oldest and most widely studied factors in the group
dynamics literature [Casey-Campbell and Martens, 2009, Mullen and Copper, 1994]. Despite
a large body of works showing that group cohesion is positively related to the group perfor-
mances, such as job satisfaction, psychological well-being, and group efficiency [Beal et al.,
2003, Carless and De Paola, 2000, Mullen and Copper, 1994], there are also some controver-
sies [Friedkin, 2004, Dyaram and Kamalanabhan, 2005, Rovio et al., 2009, Khoshsoroor et al.,
2019]. That includes groupthink [Janis and Janis, 1982], a conjecture that the effort to reach
an agreement may lead to a dysfunctional decision-making outcome. This inconsistency high-
lights the fact that our understanding of the mechanism of how group cohesion works on the
group performance is insufficient [Carron and Brawley, 2000, Casey-Campbell and Martens,
2009, McLeod and Von Treuer, 2013]. Notably, Drescher et al. [2012] even call it a spectacular
3
embarrassment in group theory and research. While apparently the complex nature of cohesion
is a major cause of such conflicting results, there exist other crucial drawbacks in the current
literature.
The principal one rests in the inconsistency of the definition and measurement of cohesion
among researchers. To make it up, Friedkin [2004] and Casey-Campbell and Martens [2009]
suggest scientists to turn focus on what is concrete and its interrelationship with other con-
structs. One milestone is the distinction between social and task cohesion [Mikalachki and
Administration, 1969, Dion and Evans, 1992, Casey-Campbell and Martens, 2009]. The social
facet includes relationships within the group, while the task facet includes collective perfor-
mance, goals, and objectives [Carron et al., 1985, Carron and Brawley, 2000]. In general, it is
found that task cohesion is more positively related to group performance than social cohesion
[Zaccaro, 1991, Bernthal and Insko, 1993, Mullen and Copper, 1994]. But unfortunately, the
explanation for it is in short either.
Another shortage in the conventional studies is the overlook of the dynamic nature of groups
[Mathieu et al., 2008, Casey-Campbell and Martens, 2009, Drescher et al., 2012, Mathieu et al.,
2015]. In reality, individuals continually join and leave different groups and in the meanwhile
interact with each other. However, most of the previous works fail to describe this dynami-
cal process, and more importantly, its influence on peoples’ decision-making. Mathieu et al.
[2015] contribute one of the most important works which proves positive reciprocal relation-
ships between cohesion and performance over time. They firstly synthesise aforetime studies
that are about the reciprocal influence of group cohesion and performance. Then they apply
the so-called structural equation (SEM) method to analyse the results, and justify their model
with data collected from a series of business simulations that last over 10 weeks. While SEM
is inspiring, scholars are cautious about drawing strong causal inference from it [Mathieu et al.,
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2015], and serious scrutiny is required before assuming the framework of the model1.
To further reveal the mechanism regarding how cohesion impacts group performance, we
take players’ decision-making into consideration using an evolutionary game theory model. In
the later half of last century, game theory was developed as a fundamental tool to analyze the
conflicts and cooperation among human society and other organisms [Aumann, 2019]. How-
ever, there are multiple deficiencies lie in the traditional theory of games that centres on the
calculation and analysis of equilibrium, such as complexity of the calculation, equilibrium se-
lection, hyperrational agents and so on. These problems motivate social scientists in a variety
of areas to turn their eyes on evolutionary game theory [Alexander, 2019]. It assumes the deci-
sion makers are short sighted, their action patterns are heuristic, and very limited information
is available. Despite the simple rules and assumptions, its effectiveness in explaining the world
wasn’t overshadowed. Especially when considering large population behavior, simple action
rules could generate complex social phenomena which coincide with the institution and social
facts [Newton, 2018].
As aforementioned, while the complex nature of cohesion makes it hard to draw an overall
conclusion, it is meaningful to focus on the concrete aspects of cohesion and apply different
theoretical tools to study it. An important characteristic of cohesion could be drawn from the
definition of Festinger [1950] that it is the resultant forces which are acting on the members to
stay in a group. That is, the more cohesive a group is, the more likely that its members would
stay within it. However, people in reality keep leaving and joining new groups for different
reasons. In game theory study, this phenomenon is studied in the model of conditional disso-
ciation, which allows dissatisfied players to break off with their opponents. This mechanism
is shown to promote cooperation in the two-person prisoners’ dilemma game [Aktipis, 2004,
Izquierdo et al., 2010, Qu et al., 2016]. Qu et al. [2019] extend this model to the public goods
1Mathieu et al. [2015] find only 17 papers that use SEM to study the reciprocal effect of cohesion and perfor-
mance, which is the most key question in the study of cohesion, not to mention other aspect of cohesion.
5
game, which is a multi-person game, and also incorporate cohesion into consideration. In the
model, if cohesion exists, group members who do not want to leave would be united together,
otherwise, all group members become single. Their main finding is that cooperation is better
promoted when cohesion exists as it results in a greater chance for cooperators to play with each
other, which is usually termed as positive assortativity [Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza, 1982, Doebeli
and Hauert, 2005, Fletcher and Doebeli, 2006, 2009].
In this paper, we examine other important aspects of cohesion in influencing group coop-
eration. In particular, as motivated above and also emphasized by Mathieu et al. [2015], we
compare social and task cohesion. Our basic model is in line with Qu et al. [2019] where a well
mixed population of players interacting with each other using the one-shot public goods game
under conditional dissociation mechanisms. Players’ leaving decisions depend on both their
own tolerance towards defections and the levels and types of cohesion. Social and task cohe-
sion are inspected separately in the first two settings and synthetically afterwards. When some
players are unsatisfied, both types of cohesion may prevent the group from dismissing. More
concretely, with social cohesion, players tend to become more tolerant toward defections; while
with task cohesion, dissatisfied players become more patient only if their goal was achieved
in the past. To be more specific, while social cohesion is described as forces irrelevant to the
history of interactions, task cohesion consists in the likelihood that a player might refer to the
play history in the last round.
Our model reveals that, social cohesion and task cohesion, defined as above, have opposite
effects on the evolution of cooperation where the former one harms it but the latter benefits it.
The main reason accounting for the failure of social cohesion and success of task cohesion in
our model is that social cohesion counteracts while the latter enhances the positive assortativity
effect [Qu et al., 2019]. With either type of cohesion, the dissociation mechanism is hindered
and players would stay together longer. So the higher the levels of cohesion are, the less likely
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that dissociation happens, which explains the negative effect of social cohesion. However, with
task cohesion, players would leave their groups for sure once they are dissatisfied in two contin-
uously rounds. Moreover, since the winning cooperative strategy is intolerant towards defection,
it is vulnerable to mistakes. Task cohesion prevents groups from being dismissed by mistakenly
defecting, which keeps the cooperative groups play together longer.
This finding partially in line with the vast empirical literature that claim task cohesion is
more positively related to group performances than social cohesion [Zaccaro and Lowe, 1988,
Zaccaro, 1991, Mullen and Copper, 1994, Chang and Bordia, 2001, Warner et al., 2012, Spink
et al., 2014]. Our finding supports the common wisdom that organizations and practitioners
should encourage team members to share successful experience more often. Intuitively, this
would increase the attraction towards teams or group pride or morale, which according to our
analysis, also increases the task cohesion that bonds group members based on shared commit-
ment to achieving goals.
Despite the difference of our results from the classical conclusion about the positive sig-
nificance of social cohesion, we will highlight other potential aspects of cohesion that may be
associated with group performance. When players are less likely to update their strategies, co-
operation is higher. In reality, people update their strategies to improve their utilities. High
levels of cohesion is usually associated with higher levels of job satisfaction, which thus re-
duces the possibility they update strategies. As the probability of making mistakes decreases,
group cooperation increases. In reality, it is reasonable to conjecture that groups with higher
levels of social cohesion would communicate more effectively and accurately and thus make
less mistakes, which improves group performances. Another more subtle one may be that so-
cial cohesion is related with selection intensity. In evolutionary game theory study, selection
intensity is an important element of the evolution dynamics. Rand et al. [2013] find that a mod-
erate level of selection intensity is optimal for the emergence of generosity behavior. In their
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experiment, they come up with a sagacious measurements for selection intensity by asking sub-
jects that among those they interact with in daily life, how clear is it which people are more or
less successful?. The more clear their answers are, the larger the selection intensity is implied.
So cohesion might be important in maintaining a relatively optimal level of selection intensity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We detail our model in Section 2 and present
the simulation results in Section 3. We then briefly examine and discuss other potential as-
pects of cohesion in Section 4. The conclusions are described in Section 5, with some further
discussion being followed in Section 6.
2 Models
2.1 Public goods game
Consider a finite population of individuals who are going to play the following public goods
games. G persons are grouped together with everyone being endowed with 1 unit of personal
token. They simultaneously decide whether or not to contribute their personal token to the
public wealth which would magnify by r(1 < r < G) times and be equally shared among all
the group members. As the reserved personal token would not increase, the payoff function for







aj + (1− ai), (1)
where aj = 1 if player j cooperates by contributing and aj = 0 if she reserves her personal
wealth in which case we say she defects.
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2.2 Conditional dissociation and strategies
Conditional dissociation mechanism [Izquierdo et al., 2010, Qu et al., 2016, 2019] has proven
to be an efficient mechanism to promote the evolution of cooperation. Initially, all players are
single players and they are randomly grouped to play the games. After each round of game,
if a player feels unsatisfied about her group, under conditional mechanism, she could decide
whether or not to stay with her current group opponents. By leaving, both she and her group
mates become single and enter the matching pool. All the single players in the pool would be
randomly regrouped to play the games in next round of game.
So, for each player i, her strategy is denoted by a tuple (ai, bi) where ai ∈ {0, 1} indi-
cates whether she is a cooperator (a1 = 1) or defector (a1 = 0) when playing the game, and
bi ∈ {0, 1, · · · , G − 1} indicates her tolerance towards defections. Denote Σ = {0, 1} ×
{0, 1, · · · , G − 1} as the strategy space for agents. We assume mistakes may happen to each
agent randomly with a fixed probability of ǫ, that is, a player who intended to cooperate may
wrongly defect and a defector may wrongly cooperate. Let di denote the number of defectors
observed by player i. Players are satisfied with their groups and choose to stay within current
group only if
di ≤ bi. (2)
A group dissolves if any of its members are dissatisfied and choose to leave. After a group
dissolves, all its members, whether satisfied or not in the last round, become single players and
enter the matching pool. Players in the matching pool regroup with each other randomly and
play in the next round.
In the above model, whenever some players are dissatisfied, their groups dissolve imme-
diately. In this paper, different types of cohesion that prevent the dissolution of groups are
investigated.
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2.3 Social cohesion and task cohesion
We compare two constructs of cohesion, i.e. social cohesion and task cohesion.
Social cohesion is the attractiveness that players feel about their groups, which is indepen-
dent of the history of games. To be more specific, for each player i, her perception of the social
cohesion, denoted by ξi = B(G, p), is a random variable satisfying a Binomial distribution p
indicates the level of social cohesion. A player is satisfied if the number of defections is no
more than the sum of her tolerance and her perceived social cohesiveness, that is,
di ≤ ξi + bi. (3)
Compared with (2), social cohesion ξi is added to the right side. Apparently, the expected
cohesion Eξi = G · p so the higher level of cohesion the more likely that player stays within the
group. Here we assume ξi to be random since it is player’s perception or feelings which usually
are affected by some other external factors and change over time. After each round of play, if a
player is dissatisfied in the sense that she observes too many defections than her tolerance and
social cohesion, she chooses to leave and all her group members enter the matching pool.
Task cohesion is dependent on how well players achieve their goals while playing together.
If a group of players have played together in the last rounds, players may refer to the history
of the last round of game. And the level of task cohesion is defined here as the probability that
players refer to the history. To be specific, with task cohesion being q, a dissatisfied player (i.e.
when the condition in Eq 2 is violated) would choose to leave the current group with probability
1 − q and would look back on the last round with probability q. If she was satisfied in the last
round, then she would still choose to stay within current group. The higher the task cohesion
is, the more likely that player would refer to the history before they make their final decisions
about leave or stay. When q = 0, players do not look back on the history and leave their current
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group immediately if they are dissatisfied. When q = 1, players always refer to the history and
stay within the current group unless they are dissatisfied in two consecutive rounds.
In our work, we investigate the role of social cohesion and task cohesion separately in the
first two settings and then jointly in the third.
2.4 Evolution dynamics
After each round of game, every player updates her strategy with a probability of δ. If a player
updates her strategy, she would learn the strategy from another player in the population. The
learning process is a Moran process [Nowak et al., 2004, Taylor et al., 2004, Szabó and Fath,
2007], which means the probability that one player’s strategy is learned by others is fi∑
fi
where




Here ui is the player’s payoff
2 and s measures the selection intensity: when s = 0, the process is
just the neutral drift and when s → ∞, it is the best-response dynamics. Meanwhile, mutations
may also happen with a fixed probability µ to the learner that she would randomly choose a
strategy from the strategy set Σ regardless of its performance. The strategy update in each
round is simultaneous which means if a player has just updated her strategy and is learned by
others, it is her former strategy rather than the new strategy could be learned.
3 Results
Our main results are derived from computer simulations. We run three series of simulations to
compare how social cohesion and task cohesion affect the group cooperation.















































(a) Evolution of cooperation

















(b) Distribution of strategies
Figure 1. The evolution of the percentages of cooperation after 106 rounds of games for
different levels of social cohesion. Mistake=0.01, Group size =5, population N = 200,
mutation rate µ=0.05, strategy updating rate δ = 0.001, r=3, selection intensity s = 1.
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3.1 Only social cohesion exists
Firstly, we investigate how different levels of social cohesion influence the emergence of coop-
eration. In this set-up, players’ decisions only depend on the current status of play. They leave
if their tolerance and the attractiveness of their group are unable to make them satisfied.
As can be seen from Figure 1(a), the stronger social cohesion is, the less cooperation is
observed. When social cohesion is fully hypothesized, only about 10 percent of players are co-
operators. This verifies that conditional dissociation is beneficial to the evolution of cooperation
from another direction but contradicts the general hypothesis that social cohesion is good for
group performances. As when social cohesion increases, conditional dissociation mechanism is
weakened and thus cooperation declines.
We can see from Figure 1(b) that when cooperation flourishes, the most successful strategy
is (1, 1) and the least tolerant strategy always performs badly. However, as strategies become
more tolerant, they perform worse. The strategy distribution is quite different to those observed
in [Qu et al., 2019], where the only winning cooperative strategy is the most intolerant one
i.e.(1, 0). One major difference is that in their model, whenever some players update their
strategies, their groups dismiss. Compared with (1, 0) strategists, players using (1, 1) settle
down more quickly as they could tolerate one more defector. At this point, despite being ex-
ploited by the single defector, their payoffs are higher than the average of the whole population
and they are more likely learned by other agents, which means they are more successful in the
evolution.
3.2 Only task cohesion exists
With task cohesion, individuals may make their leaving decisions based on both the current and















































(a) Evolution of cooperation for different task cohesion

















(b) Evolution of cooperation for different task cohesion
Figure 2. The evolution of the percentages of cooperation after 106 rounds of games for
different levels of task cohesion. Mistake=0.05, Group size =5, population N = 200, error
rate=0.05, strategy updating rate δ = 0.001, r=3, selection intensity s = 1.
As can be seen from Figure 2, the effect of task cohesion is indistinguishable when cohesion
is smaller than 0.5. However, as task cohesion increases, cooperation increases substantially.
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The cooperation level is highest when players always consider the play history in the last round.
The strategy distribution is similar to the situation where only social cohesion exists. When
task cohesion is 1, the winning cooperative strategy is also (1, 1). A tiny difference is that,
except for (1, 1) that performs better and better as task cohesion increases, all the remaining
cooperative strategies perform almost the same in different settings.
Since positive assortativity is the explanation for how dissociation mechanism promotes
cooperation, it would be natural to investigate how task cohesion enhances it. In the study
of conditional dissociation mechanisms, players are rather impulsive that whenever they feel
dissatisfied, they would leave their opponents immediately. Intuitively, when a group of coop-
erators meet together, they would continue playing together until someone defects by mistake.
In our model, with higher levels of task cohesion, players get more discreet before they decide
whether to stay within the current group or not. And a pleasant history of play would stop the
dissolution of groups. So with higher levels of task cohesion, cooperative groups are less likely
to dissolve which means enhanced positive assortativity. In Figure 3, we present the results of
evolution for different levels of social cohesion, task cohesion and mistake rates. It can be easily
seen that cooperation rates always decrease as mistake rates increase. Both types of cohesion
reduce the differences of cooperation rates under low mistake rates and high mistake rates but at
different directions. When the mistake rate is low, the effect of increasing task cohesion is rather
limited while it is obvious that increasing social cohesion is detrimental to cooperation. When
the mistake rate is higher, the advantage of higher level task cohesion becomes more obvious,
which suggests that task cohesion is effective in preserving cooperation from mistakes.
3.3 Both social and task cohesion exist
We now combine both types of cohesion and examine whether there is any synergy effect from
the combination. In each round of the game, player i is satisfied if and only if the number of
15
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Figure 3. The percentage of cooperation after 106 rounds of simulations with different levels
social cohesion, task cohesion and mistake rate. The colors and sizes represent the percentages
of cooperation. The more cooperation, the larger the circle filled with the hotter color. Group
size =5, population N = 200, mutation rate µ=0.05, strategy updating rate δ = 0.001, r=3,
selection intensity s = 1.
observed defections di, her tolerance, and the perceived social cohesiveness satisfy equation (3).
With task cohesion, every player might also refer to the history to determine whether or not to
leave. If a dissatisfied player doesn’t refer to the history, or she was also dissatisfied in the last
round, she leaves. Otherwise, a player would remain in her group if she is satisfied in current
round or she refers to the history and finds herself satisfied in the last round.
Our results suggest the negative effect of social cohesion and positive effect of task cohesion
remain when both types of cohesion exist. In Figure 4, we present the outcomes for different
levels of social and task cohesion. For any levels of task cohesion, the proportions of coop-
eration decrease with increasing social cohesion, which indicates the negative effect of social
cohesion. On the other hand, if we increase the levels of task cohesion, we observe higher lev-
els of cooperation with higher levels of task cohesion. So task cohesion promotes cooperation
whatever levels of social cohesion are.
The different effects for the evolution of cooperation in group interactions from the two
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types of cohesion further support the idea to differentiate between them in real-world social and
economic contexts.
























Figure 4. The percentages of cooperation after 106 rounds of games for different levels of
social and task cohesion. Mistake rate=0.01, Group size =5, population N = 200, mutation
rate µ=0.05, strategy updating rate δ = 0.001, r=3, selection intensity s = 1.
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4 Potential aspects of cohesion
While contradicting the common viewpoint that suggests positive relationship between social
cohesion and group cooperation, our model sheds light on other potential aspects of cohesion,
which could improve group performances but are not involved in the current model.
4.1 Strategy updating and mistake rate
Our model confirms with the classical conclusion that cooperation is more abundant under lower
strategy updating rate (Figure 3) and mistake rate (Figure 5).
Cohesion may lead to lower levels of strategy updating rate since it increases individuals’
sanctification. In human society, people change their strategies continually for different reasons.
The primary one would be to pursue better outcomes so they learn it from more successful ones.
With higher levels of group cohesion, players are more easily to be satisfied, so their incentives
to pursue better outcomes decline, and update their strategies less.
In reality, everyone makes mistakes but by being more careful, they are less likely to do
so. The sense of responsibility has been emphasized by some other studies [Chan et al., 2006,
Dickes et al., 2010, Schiefer and van der Noll, 2017] on cohesion. With higher cohesion, players
feel more responsible to act carefully, which thus could reduce the probability that individuals
make mistakes. As the winning cooperative strategy is also intolerant of defections, less mis-
takes help them to play together longer and gain more benefits.
4.2 Selection intensity
In the study of evolutionary game theory, selection intensity has determinant influence on the
outcomes. However, in reality, how it is related to human society or even natural world is not
so clear. Rand et al. [2013] measure selection intensity by asking subjects how clear to tell that
18











































Figure 5. The percentage of cooperation after 106 rounds of simulations with different levels
social cohesion, task cohesion and strategy updating rate. The colors and sizes represent the
percentages of cooperation. The more cooperation, the larger the circle filled with the hotter
color. Group size =5, population N = 200, mutation rate µ=0.05, selection intensity s = 1,
r=3. The mistake rate is 0.01 in figure a for social cohesion and it is 0.05 in figure b for task
cohesion.
someone is more successful. This measurement obviously is related to the social and cultural
aspects of our society, which have non-trivial influences on human behavior. Inspired by Rand
et al. [2013], our model also suggests that social cohesion may forge a medium level of selection
intensity is better for group cooperation.
It is worthwhile to remind that, with tiny selection intensity (say it is being 0.05), the dis-
tributions of strategies remain almost unchanged, so we see similar levels of cooperation (near
50%) in all settings in Figure 6. When only a low level of social cohesion exists, cooperation
rates firstly increase and then decrease as the selection intensities increase. When a high level
of social cohesion exists, cooperation always decreases as selection intensities increase. With
medium social cohesion (=0.5), if we increase the selection intensities from 0.05 to 0.5, co-
operation decreases because it is not favored by evolution. However, we would see a larger
proportion of cooperation if selection intensity is 1 or 2. But again cooperation almost vanishes
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Figure 6. The percentage of cooperation after 106 rounds of simulations with different levels
social cohesion, task cohesion and selection intensity. The colors and sizes represent the
percentages of cooperation. The more cooperation, the larger the circle filled with the hotter
color. Group size =5, population N = 200, mutation rate µ=0.05, strategy updating rate
δ = 0.001, r=3. The mistake rate is 0.01 in figure a for social cohesion and it is 0.05 in figure b
for task cohesion.
under too high selection intensities.
Intuitively, when the selection intensity is too weak, then all the strategies almost make no
difference in the evolution so we could not expect high levels of cooperation. When selection
intensity is too strong, the lucky defectors whose opponents are all cooperators would get the
highest payoffs and gain more success. So medium levels of selection intensity is best for
cooperation.
5 Conclusion
Cohesion is one of the most widely studied concepts in small-group performance an intra- and
intergroup relations [Evans and Dion, 1991, Carron and Brawley, 2000, Chiocchio and Essiem-
bre, 2009] as it is essential for teams where people of different talents and background meet
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together to collaborate on common tasks. However, due to the complicated and elusive nature,
researches have to face the difficulty in defining, measuring, operationalizing, and experimen-
tally manipulating cohesion [Carron and Brawley, 2000]. And it always gives people the feeling
of inconsistency when reviewing the literature relevant to cohesion[Rosh et al., 2012]. Obvi-
ously, it is hard to unify all the previous definitions and measurements without giving new ones,
which in turn only add to the incoherence within this field of study. Friedkin [2004] and Dion
[2000] call for emphasis on the solid aspects of cohesion rather than trying to propose new ones,
which is more practical and heuristic.
One of the most significant and generally admitted findings in the study of cohesion is
the distinction between social and task cohesion, which is referred as a milestone by Evans and
Dion [1991]. In general various meta-analyses of existing cohesion studies are in agreement that
group performances are more strongly related with task cohesion than social cohesion [Mullen
and Copper, 1994, Casey-Campbell and Martens, 2009, Chiocchio and Essiembre, 2009, Cas-
tano et al., 2013, Grossman et al., 2015]. In these studies, the definitions and measurements of
cohesion are usually different among the literature, making it hard to compare which factors are
more crucial in the cohesion-performance relation. Salas et al. [2015] conduct a meta-analysis
and highlight that further study should give priority to social and task cohesion and incorporate
dynamical and temporal factors into study.
Inspired by these suggestions and empirical observations, we compare in this work how
social and task cohesion influence the emergence of cooperation by resorting to evolutionary
game theory, since in this field, there has been significant success in understanding the dynamic
processes of group and agreement formation and interactive strategies among group members
[Szabó and Fath, 2007, Han et al., 2015, 2017, Newton, 2018] In particular, conditional disso-
ciation mechanisms allow players to leave their groups once they are dissatisfied about their
opponents and have been proven beneficial for cooperation to evolve [Izquierdo et al., 2010,
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Qu et al., 2016, 2019, Aktipis, 2004]. We introduce group cohesion into this process to study
how group cohesion influences the performance of groups and the evolutionary outcomes of
cooperation.
Unlike psychological study where the definitions of cohesion are largely dependent on the
measurement the researchers choose, our definitions of social and task cohesion are provided
according to the intrinsic nature of individual choices and decision making. Social cohesion is
defined as a strength that prevents players from leaving their groups regardless of the history
of the play. With higher levels of social cohesion, players are more tolerant towards defections
and thus more refrain from leaving. Task cohesion is modeled as the likelihood that unsatisfied
players would look back into the history before they choose to leave. If they were satisfied
about the outcomes in the last round of play, they would choose to stay.
Our primary finding is that social cohesion has a negative effect on the group cooperation
while task cohesion has a positive effect. The difference of the effect of social and task cohe-
sion could be illustrated from the perspective of positive assortativity, which is termed as the
common characters of almost all mechanisms that promote cooperation, including conditional
dissociation [Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza, 1982, Doebeli and Hauert, 2005, Fletcher and Doebeli,
2009, Izquierdo et al., 2010, Qu et al., 2019]. With either type of cohesion, dissatisfied co-
operators are less likely to leave their groups, which means cohesion hinders the conditional
dissociation mechanism. However, task cohesion enhances positive assortativity by enforcing
cooperative groups. As cooperation is vulnerable to defections or mistakes, task cohesion helps
players to distinguish if the defection is intentional. A higher level of task cohesion enables
players to be more patient and thus protects cooperators from entering a more defective match
pool. So for organizational practitioners, when monitoring and improving cohesion, recalling
the successful history regularly would benefit the team for a more productive team fulfillment.
We also discuss other parameters of the evolutionary dynamics and their influence on the co-
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operation, which is a standard approach in evolutionary game study. Our discussion is central on
how it is related to other aspects of cohesion and its impact on group performances. Compared
with the complicated nature of cohesion, our model is rather simple yet very powerful in that
it is capable of revealing the underlying evolutionary dynamics related to cohesion, shedding
light on the mechanisms based on which cohesion influences group cooperation.
6 Further discussion
Cohesion is such an important and complex concept that many aspects of it need to be further
examined in future.
The first one is to study other categories of games which enable us to explore cohesion from
different angles. Both our paper and Qu et al. [2019] apply the public goods game, which is
the most studied multi-person game. But, apparently in reality, people engage in other types of
interactions too. Sometimes, people need to coordinate on a common action or idea, then the
coordination game could be a better choice for study. Other well-known game models including
stag-hunt game, battle of sex, ultimatum game and etc. [Szabó and Fath, 2007] could also be
applied to analyze different kinds of conflicts and interests among group members.
In our model, while both social and task cohesion are random and change over time, there
is no direction of the changes. So our model doesn’t incorporate the reciprocal effect between
cohesion and performances. In previous works, different or even contradictory patterns of co-
hesion are found in military units [Bartone and Adler, 1999, Siebold, 2006]. Grossman et al.
[2015] suggest that social cohesion emerges first then members shift attention to task cohesion.
After they achieve more resources by accomplishing group goals, they in turn enhance social
cohesion and finally both cohesion become stable over time. So the second direction for further
study would be to take the time inconsistency into consideration and in particular, the reciprocal
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effect between social and task cohesion.
Our models assume well-mixed population, and it is definitely necessary and interesting
to investigate the influence of cohesion in structured populations or spatial networks where
certain individuals are more likely to interact than others. Aktipis [2011] and Ichinose et al.
[2018] study conditional dissociation mechanism on spatial networks and complex networks
respectively. There are multiple ways to introduce cohesion into their models. Cohesion may
be referred to as how often players want to leave, how far they can migrate to other parts in the
network, and when updating strategies, how far neighbors can be imitated. Since different types
of networks (e.g., homogeneous vs heterogeneous) exhibit different tendencies in promoting
cooperation, it would even more exciting to investigate how these topological properties interact
with different aspects of cohesion.
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful tool in analyzing group dynamics and behaviors.
Cohesion is an important concept in understanding team dynamics and performances. Our
work suggests it is promising to apply evolutionary game theory to study cohesion in more
diverse directions, which may provide other interesting results and help us better understand
how cohesion facilitates group performances.
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